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Abstract
This article uses firm × national market export and import data for all Swedish
private sector firms for 1997–2014 to examine the firm-level contribution of
trade and foreign ownership to the correlation between Swedish value added
growth and partner country gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Export and
import links increase the firm-level correlation but net out for firms that both
export to and import from the same market, evidence that this type of ‘natural
hedging’ can help reduce a firm's exposure to foreign economic shocks. We
proceed to aggregate the firm-level results to the whole economy and find that
severing firm-level ties with a foreign market is predicted to lower the correla-
tion between Swedish value added growth and foreign GDP growth from 0.72
to 0.64 on average. Gabaix's ‘granularity’ of trade is central to this result: if all
firms are given equal weight overall correlations are essentially unaffected by
severing firm level ties. Natural hedging is quantitatively important at the firm
level and also plays a role in limiting overall comovements.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The distribution of firm size is highly skewed and shocks
to large firms can have important aggregate effects as
shown by a recent empirical literature (see
e.g., Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, & Tahbaz-Salehi,-
2012; di Giovanni, Levchenko, & Mejean, 2014;
Gabaix, 2011). Similarly, the international trade of coun-
tries is typically dominated by relatively few firms and in
recent work di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2018)
examine the role of international firm-level linkages in
explaining the correlation of international business
cycles. Using French data for 1993–2007 they establish
that firm-level linkages with foreign markets in terms of
trade and affiliations within multinational firms matter
substantially for the correlation between the French
value added growth and GDP growth of partner coun-
tries. On average severing such linkages is predicted to
lower the correlation with a foreign country from around
0.3 to 0.2.
The current article makes use of similarly rich firm ×
national market export and import data for all Swedish
private sector firms for 1997–2014 to examine the firm
level contribution of trade on international comovement.
Our main innovation is to examine the transmission of
international shocks when the firm both imports and
exports from the same currency area. Matching the origin
of imports with the destination of exports (henceforth
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referred to as simply ‘matching trade’) could reduce a
firm's exposure to foreign shocks, or alternatively could
increase a firm's exposure to foreign shocks. We investi-
gate whether it is net trade or gross trade that matters in
determining a firm's exposure to foreign shocks.
di Giovanni et al. (2018) use dummy variables to cap-
ture whether a firm exports to and imports from a given
market. One might interpret this as implying that the
effects are determined by gross trade. This follows the
thrust of the previous literature on the links between
bilateral trade and the correlation of national growth
which has examined the link between GDP growth and
bilateral trade, as measured by the sum of exports and
imports (see e.g., Frankel & Rose, 1998; Imbs, 2004;
Johnson, 2014; Ductor & Leiva-Leon, 2016). The focus in
the previous literature has thus been on gross trade.
Our article is motivated by the hypothesis that, at
least for some types of shocks, it is net trade that deter-
mines exposure: the effects of exports and imports on
firm level correlations with foreign GDP might be partly
offset.1 For instance, consider a positive growth shock to
the United Kingdom which leads to a depreciation of the
Swedish krona (SEK) against the British pound. Other
things equal a depreciation of SEK that increases export
revenue from UK (when measured in SEK) will at the
same time increase import costs from the UK and offset
the effect on profits. This is an example where the net
exposure will be lower than gross exposures and serves as
a motivation for the examination of the effect of two-way
trade on firm-level correlations with foreign GDP. We
document that matched trade at the firm level is indeed
common in the Swedish data using a modified Grubel–
Lloyd index, which has been used previously to charac-
terize the degree of intra-industry trade.
We find that firms that match trade reduce their expo-
sure to foreign shocks. We also establish effects of gross
trade that are similar to the effects reported by di Giovanni
et al. (2018) using French data. Thus, exporting to, or
importing from, a market exposes the firm to shocks origi-
nating from that market, but matching exports and imports
effectively reduces the firm's exposure to these shocks.
According to our model, the predicted correlation between
a foreign market's GDP growth and the firm's value added
growth is close to zero for instances of matched trade. This
suggests that at the firm level, it is net trade that determines
the exposure of the firm to foreign shocks.
This first set of results is a contribution to micro-
economic and corporate finance aspects of trade. Matched
trade flows at the firm level might come about by differential
trade costs (as in gravity models of trade, see e.g., Head &
Mayer, 2014 or Chaney, 2018) or in other ways that might be
viewed as a coincidence from the perspective of the firm. It
might also come about through strategic risk management
decisions by firms (‘natural hedging’). In teaching of risk
management (see e.g., Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2017), and in
discussions of firm risk management strategies, a policy of
‘natural hedging’ or ‘matching of currency footprints’ is often
discussed. For instance in its annual report Daimler (2017,
p. 303) states ‘The Group's currency exposure is reduced by
natural hedging…To provide an additional natural hedge
against any remaining transaction risk exposure, Daimler
generally strives to increase cash outflows in the same cur-
rencies in which the Group has a net excess inflow’.2
In the present article, we do not try to establish the
motivation for matched trade at the firm level. We aim to
provide evidence on the effects of natural hedging, of
interest to the literature on risk management, by docu-
menting whether more balanced trade flows at the firm
level are associated with a lower correlation between firm
level value added and foreign GDP.3 Note that we apply
the term ‘natural hedging’ somewhat loosely. Strictly
speaking matching trade at the country-firm level only
acts as a hedge for a well-defined exchange rate shock
and matching imports and exports do not neccesarily
serve as a hedge for other country-specific shocks, an
argumentation that we develop further below.
The new micro-evidence in this article supports the
notion that natural hedging of currency risk has a strong
effect on firm variability in value added. We are not aware
of any previous research that attempts to quantify the
effect of this type of natural hedging on the variability of
value added.4 Let us however highlight an important
related article, using similar data as we do, which estab-
lishes that the pass-through of exchange rate changes into
export prices is lowered if the net effect on marginal cost is
moderated by a large share of imported inputs (Amiti,
Itskhoki, and Konings (2014)). While the focus in that arti-
cle differs from the present, it similarly establishes impor-
tant connections between import and export markets.
Does the firm-level phenomenon of matched trade
that we report have macro-economic implications for the
role of bilateral trade in the international transmission of
shocks? We establish that firm-level trade/affiliate links
provide an important contribution to international
business-cycle comovements. On average severing, these
firm-level international links reduces the correlation
between Swedish value added growth and foreign GDP
growth from 0.722 to approximately 0.621. Firm granu-
larity plays an important role in these counterfactual
exercises. If all firms were equal in size (in terms of
sales), then the contribution of firm-level linkages would
be substantially reduced. The largest firms thus play a
central role in the international transmission of shocks.
Moreover, we establish that matched trade at the firm
level has a economically significant effect on aggregate
correlations between Swedish and foreign GDP. The
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aggregate effect of severing firm-level international links
is reduced by around 20% when matched trade effects are
included. In sum, we document substantial effects of
matched trade both at the firm-level and in aggregate.
These results tie into a rich literature that examines the
role of bilateral trade in the international transmission of
shocks. As noted above the literature typically reports a
strong positive relation between trade and business cycle
comovements: countries that trade more have stronger
covariance of business cycles. Understanding the reasons for
the correlation is important for instance for understanding
the effects of a monetary union (which motivated the semi-
nal work of Frankel & Rose, 1998) or more broadly for
understanding how shocks affect the world economy. Gener-
ating the magnitude of business cycle comovement found in
the data in theoretical international real business cycle
models has proven elusive and generated a large body of
work focused on understanding how models can match the
facts (see e.g., Johnson, 2014; Kose & Yi, 2006). One concern
with the interpretation of empirical work is that common
shocks, rather than trade itself, might be driving correlations
and substantive work finds important effects for other link-
ages, for instance financial linkages (see e.g., Imbs, 2004;
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, & Peydro, 2013). With rela-
tively aggregated data it is hard to control for the types of
shocks that affect economic activity, in particular as they
might concern expectations (see e.g., Forbes & Rigobon, 2002
for a related examination of international stock market com-
ovement). By using differential trade patterns for different
firms di Giovanni et al. (2018) have been able to rely on firm-
level data to identify effects of trade linkages on correlations.
In following their approach, we add to the evidence on the
causal contribution of trade to business cycle comovements.5
The next section outlines a theoretical framework and
presents the empirical model used to estimate the effects
of (matched) export and import flows on correlations with
foreign GDP. Section 3 presents the data and describes
bilateral trade patterns at the firm level in detail. Section 4
then presents results, first at the firm level and then at the
aggregate level. The final section concludes.
2 | MATCHED TRADE AND THE
TRANSMISSION OF FOREIGN
SHOCKS TO THE FIRM
2.1 | Theoretical motivation
At the firm level, trade and multinational linkages with a
foreign country are associated with a significantly higher
correlation between the firm and that country (di Giovanni
et al., 2018). However, some firms export and import from
the same country, that is, they engage in matched trade.
Matching trade may increase or decrease the firm's expo-
sure to foreign shocks. The outcome depends in part on the
nature of the foreign shocks. In the following, we outline a
simple theoretical framework to anchor the discussion.6
Consider a firm f that sells to a set of countries
(including the home country) indexed with n  (i, N) and
uses intermediate inputs from various source countries
m  (1, M) in year t. Export and import destinations are
taken as given and we thus disregard the extensive mar-
gin of trade.7 Assume that the marginal cost of producing
is constant such that the profit function is separable
across destinations: cfnt = cft 8 n. Further assume that
firms' technology is given by a Cobb–Douglas production
function with labor and intermediate goods as production







where α is the labor share and all firms face an identical
labor cost w. 1 − α is the share of intermediate goods in
costs. pI,m denotes the price of intermediate goods sou-
rced from country m and SMfm is the firm specific share
of inputs from country m. The home country is one of
the m potential sources, which allows the model to cap-
ture a pure exporter.
Further assume that demand in country n for firm f
0
s
product is log-linear with elasticity σ > 1 and affected by
a market-specific demand shifter Dn. Profit for a firm







where pfnt denotes the firm's price in market n. Maximiza-
tion of profits with respect to price gives the standard condi-
tion that pfnt = cft(σ/(σ − 1)). Substituting marginal costs
(Equation 1) and optimal prices into the expression for
profit (Equation 2) yields an expression for profit as depen-
dent on wages, import prices, demand shocks and the set of
countries with which a firm trades. We take the natural log-
arithm of the resulting expression and use total differentia-
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where SXfnt − 1 is the share of market n in a firm's reve-
nue and SMfmt − 1 is the share of intermediate inputs
from country m. The shares SXfn and SMfm are hence-
forth assumed to be constant to simplify the exposition.8
With these basic elements in place, we first examine
two cases where a firm is exposed to shocks originating
from a foreign country: (a) a pure exporter, (b) a firm that
both exports and imports (matched trade).
If we assume that all shocks are uncorrelated across
countries, then a firm that exports to a country n but does
not import from that country would have a covariance
with country n as given by
cov γft ,γnt
 
= SXfn × cov dlnDnt,γntð Þ ð4Þ
where γnt denotes the growth rate of GDP in year t in
country n. A firm that both exports to, and imports from,




= SXfn × cov dlnDnt,γntð Þ
− σ−1ð Þ 1−αð ÞSMfn × cov dlnpInt,γnt
  ð5Þ
If revenue and cost move in the same direction in
response to a foreign shock, that is, if both cov
(dlnDnt, γnt) and cov dlnpInt,γnt
 
have the same sign, then
matching trade decreases cov(γft, γnt). This is clearly the
case if prices are rigid in the currency of the country of
production and the exchange rate is a main conduit for
the shock. Higher export revenue due to a deprecation
against country n are then offset by higher cost of imports
from n.9 Nominal exchange rate movements notwith-
standing, there are clearly other events that would yield
the same outcome, such as positive growth shocks in
country n can increase sales revenue and import costs at
the same time.
However, matching trade would increase the firm's
exposure to foreign shocks if cov(dlnDnt, γnt) and
cov dlnpInt,γnt
 
have different signs. For example, a nega-
tive GDP shock in the foreign country, due to political
gridlock and/or labor strikes, could plausibly lead to a fall
in demand (negative revenue shock) and higher cost of






In the latter case Equation (6), together with Equa-
tion (5), imply that revenue and cost shocks amplify the
volatility of profits for a firm that matches exports and
imports with a single country. Sourcing inputs from the
same destination country would then increase the firm's
exposure to shocks specific to that country.
The theoretical discussion has highlighted that simul-
taneously exporting to, and importing from, a given for-
eign country can both lower and raise the correlation of
firm level value added with country-specific shocks rela-
tive to a pure exporter and analogously for a pure
importer. The model as presented indicates that the
effects of exports and imports on covariance are additive.
This implies that in the empirical work that follows it
would not be a concern if the effect of source country
shocks on the correlation with a firm's value added were
identified mainly off of pure importers. However, under
the simple structure above, imports are only intermediate
inputs in production and source country shocks only
affect value added via import prices.
In practice, we may expect a richer set of shocks to
affect costs and demand. Particularly important may be
that imports of final goods from a country might increase
as an effect of local demand shocks that are correlated
with source country growth. As a simple example note
that growth in Italy might be correlated with a taste
shock for Italian food products among Swedish con-
sumers. Consider a case where some imports are con-
sumption goods and are imported by a wholesaler h with
the same demand function as above but with a simpler





Value added growth for such a pure importer
would be
γht≈dlnSmt− σ−1ð ÞdlnpI,mt
and a positive covariance between Sm shocks and source
country GDP growth can generate a strong positive corre-
lation between firm growth in value added and source
country shocks. This highlights that pure importers of
finished products may be quite different from firms that
both export and import. To allow for this to impact, the
estimations we allow for effects that are different for
firms that match trade with a given partner country than
for those that do not.
2.2 | Empirical model
We follow the methodology of di Giovanni et al. (2018).
The growth rate of firm value added is defined as
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γft = πft/πft − 1 − 1. Let ωft − 1 denote the share of firm f in
the aggregate value added of Swedish firms. The growth
in total Swedish value added is γAt =
P
fωft − 1γft. Interna-
tional comovement is measured by the correlation
between GDP growth rate of country n denoted by γnt,
and the growth in total Swedish value added γAt. This
correlation can be rewritten as the weighted sum of firm


















where σf, σA and σn are the standard deviations of the
growth rates of firm value added, aggregate Swedish
value added and country n GDP, respectively. To exam-
ine the firm-level determinants of the correlation
between value added growth of firm f and country n GDP
growth, we estimate the following equation:
ρ γft,γn,t
 
= α+ β1EXf ,n + β2EXf ,n ×match
EX
f ,n
+ β3IMf ,n + β4IMf ,n ×match
IM
f ,n + β5AFFf ,n + δf + δn + ηf ,n:
ð9Þ
EXf,n is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firm f
exports to country n over at least 4 years. IMf,n is the
corresponding dummy variable for imports.
We also include indicator variables to capture
instances where a firm imports to and exports from the
same country: matchEXf ,n is a dummy that is equal to 1 if
firm f both exports and imports with country n and
exports more than it imports from country n (i.e., is a net
exporter) and matchIMf ,n is the corresponding dummy vari-
ables for imports. Absent these interactions effects the
impact of the exporter and importer dummy variables on
the correlation will be identified by pure exporters, pure
importers and by firms that both import and export:
matched trade effects are not separately identified.
Inclusion of the interaction terms allows for a refine-
ment of the interpretation for the impact of matched
export and import flows on the correlation of a firm's
growth with foreign GDP. As exemplified by the discus-
sion of source-country specific demand shocks in the
previous section, the estimates of correlations based on
pure importers of consumer goods may for instance
reflect different mechanisms than those for two-way
traders that import intermediate inputs. That said, the
model is reduced-form and does not allow us to distin-
guish various structural sources of comovements.
Results may therefore be sensitive to the period and idi-
osyncrasies of Swedish trade.
AFFf,n is dummy variable that takes the value 1 if firm
f is an affiliate of a firm in n. Firm and country fixed
effects are denoted by δ and finally ηf,N is an econometric
error term. Apart from the interaction terms with
matchEXf ,n and match
IM
f ,n , this specification is identical to
the benchmark specification in di Giovanni
et al. (2018).10
In a second set of regressions, we estimate the same
specification but use continuous levels of exports and
imports. We define SXf,n as the average share of firm f's
export revenue from country n in total firm sales for
firms that export at least 4 years from a country. Like-
wise, SMf,n is the average share of firm f import costs
from country n in total firm costs for firms that import at
least 4 years from a country.
3 | DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS
Our source of data is Sweden's official statistical agency,
SCB (2019). We use yearly data on firm × country exports
and imports for all Swedish private sector firms with at
least 10 employees.11 We consider trade with the 15 larg-
est export destinations during this time period.12 The
trade data are from Statistics Sweden and cover
1997–2014. The dummy variable on whether a firm is a
Swedish affiliate (AFF) of a country n firm is from the
database Serrano.13 Sweden has a floating exchange rate
throughout the period.
Table 1 describes these bilateral trade patterns at the
firm level. The average firm in the sample exports to
around four destinations (out of the 15) and imports from
around four origins. While there is some overlap it is
clear that many firms do not match trade: the majority of
firms either export to, or import from, a given market as
indicated by the fact that the average number of trading
partners is above eight. At the firm level, the correlation
between the number of export and import markets is 0.74
suggesting that firms that exports to more destinations
also import from more origins. Both exports and imports
are quite concentrated as indicated by mean Herfindahl–
Hirschmann indices (HHI) of export and import concen-
tration of around 0.75.14
To further gauge the magnitude of matched trade at
the firm level we consider a close analogue of Grubel–
Lloyd index of intra-industry trade, used to measure the
extent a country exports and imports the same goods
(Grubel and Lloyd (1975)). We are interested in the over-
all balance of flows with different trading partners and
therefore adapt the method to a Grubel–Lloyd index of
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‘natural hedging’, which we denote GLINH. It is analo-
gous to a Grubel–Lloyd index of intra-industry trade at
the level of total manufacturing (see e.g., OECD (2011)).













where Xnft is the value (in SEK) of exports to country n in
year t and Mnft is the analogous value for imports. The
index takes a value 100 if the firm's trade flows are per-
fectly matched across all foreign markets N, and a value of
0 if trade flows are totally unbalanced. GLINH is therefore
a measure of natural hedging at the firm level and higher
values are associated with more natural hedging.15 To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first application of the
Grubel–Lloyd index to firm-level trade flows. Across the
sample of firms engaged in trade, GLINH averages around
12, indicating a relatively low level of natural hedging. For
perspective note that a firm which sells for 80 SEK to one
market and 20 SEK to another, and imports for 10 SEK
from both markets, achieves a GLINH of 33.
The lower panel of Table 1 reports the same statistics
for the largest 50 firms in the sample. As expected, the
largest firms have more trade partners, and have a higher
incidence of matched trade with a mean GLINH of
around 30. These largest firms will therefore have a dis-
proportionate effect on transmitting foreign shocks to
aggregate effects in Sweden.
In Table 2, we report summary statistics for the regres-
sion sample. The average correlation between firm-level
value added growth and trading partner GDP growth is
0.07.16 The dummy variables that capture trade patterns
imply that on average 5.7% of observations correspond to
cases where a firm exports to a given market and 6.3% to
imports from a given market. Similarly, 3.2% of observa-
tions are observations where a firm is a net exporter but
also has positive imports from the country n and 2.3% of
observations are for firms that have bilateral trade with
country n but are net importers from that country. The fol-
lowing rows give the corresponding summary statistics for
these trade flows expressed in values rather than as
dummy variables indicating a positive trade flow. Around
0.8% of observations correspond to the case where a firm
is a Swedish affiliate of a firm based in n.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Firm-level correlations
We first replicate the results of di Giovanni et al. (2018),
using dummy variables to capture firm trade links. The
TABLE 1 Firm-level trade linkages, Sweden 1997–2014
Statistic Nr. export destinations Nr. import origins Nr. trading partners HHI exports HHI imports GLINH
Full sample of firms
Mean 4.16 4.34 8.50 0.75 0.79 12.42
SD 4.94 4.40 8.42 0.32 0.29 17.21
p1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p50 2.00 3.00 6.00 0.89 0.92 4.45
p99 15.00 14.00 29.00 1.00 1.00 74.32
N 200,316 200,316 200,316 200,316 200,316 200,316
50 largest firms
Mean 9.46 11.03 20.49 0.69 0.77 30.31
SD 5.87 5.26 10.39 0.25 0.20 22.28
p1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00
p50 12.00 13.00 25.00 0.75 0.83 31.13
p99 15.00 15.00 30.00 1.00 1.00 82.41
N 653.00 653.00 653.00 653.00 653.00 653.00
Note: The table presents summary statistics at the firm level for Swedish private sector firms engaged in importing and/or exporting over the
period 1997–2014. HHI exports is a Herfindahl–Hirschmann index of concentration: the sum of squared shares of value of exports over mar-
kets N over total firm exports, and analogously for HHI imports. GLINH is an extension of Grubel–Lloyd index to measure the degree of
two-way trade at the firm level as described in the text.
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results from estimating Equation (9) are reported in
Table 3, Columns (1), (2) and (3). In Column (1), we see
that firms which export to, or import from, a country have
a higher correlation with that county's GDP growth. Under
Column (2) we add firm fixed effects and find that
exporting to a country raises the correlation by 0.003 and
importing raises the correlation by 0.009. These numbers
are similar in magnitude as the corresponding figures in di
Giovanni et al. (2018).17 The firm fixed effects account for a
large share of the variation in the data and we see that R-
squared increases sharply. Under Column (3) we add coun-
try fixed effects and find that the coefficients are somewhat
larger, and that being an affiliate of a firm based in a given
country raises the correlation by around 0.008.
TABLE 2 Summary statistics
regression sample of firms, Sweden
1997–2014
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
ρ(γf,t, γn,t) Correlation 0.072 0.575 −1 1
EXf,n Exporter dummy 0.057 0.232 0 1
IMf,n Importer dummy 0.063 0.243 0 1
EXf ,n ×matchEXf ,n 0.032 0.176 0 1
IMf ,n ×matchIMf ,n 0.023 0.15 0 1
SXf,n Exporter share 0.002 0.024 0 0.998
SMf,n Importer share 0.002 0.018 0 0.959
SXf ,n ×matchEXf ,n 0.002 0.022 0 0.998
SMf ,n ×matchIMf ,n 0.001 0.013 0 0.902
AFFf,n Affiliate 0.008 0.089 0 1
N = 1,207,530
Note: The table presents summary statistics on the sample used in regressions reported in
Tables 3 and 4. The first row is the dependent variable in regressions ρ(γft, γnt): the firm-level
correlation in value added growth with country n GDP growth. Rows 2–5 give the export,
import and matched trade dummy variables as used in Table 3 and rows 6–9 the corresponding
levels of trade. AFF is a dummy for if firm f is an affiliate of a firm in n.
TABLE 3 Correlation with foreign GDP and firm level trade linkages (dummy variables), Sweden 1997–2014
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exporter 0.0490*** 0.00292* 0.00378** 0.0551*** 0.00723*** 0.00551***
(0.00330) (0.00162) (0.00175) (0.00417) (0.00206) (0.00209)
Importer 0.0464*** 0.00894*** 0.0108*** 0.0528*** 0.0124*** 0.0124***
(0.00295) (0.00140) (0.00147) (0.00342) (0.00163) (0.00168)
Exporter × net exp. −0.0111** −0.00822*** −0.00337
(0.00449) (0.00241) (0.00246)
Importer × net imp. −0.0161*** −0.00886*** −0.00427*
(0.00430) (0.00232) (0.00233)
Affiliate −0.0115** 0.00590 0.00758* −0.0109** 0.00613 0.00771*
(0.00525) (0.00412) (0.00412) (0.00526) (0.00413) (0.00413)
Constant 0.0660*** 0.0708*** 0.0877*** 0.0660*** 0.0708*** 0.0877***
(0.00144) (0.000112) (0.00115) (0.00144) (0.000112) (0.00115)
Observations 1,207,530 1,207,530 1,207,530 1,207,530 1,207,530 1,207,530
R-squared 0.001 0.452 0.453 0.001 0.452 0.453
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Note: This table reports the result of estimation Equation (9) with ρ(γft, γnt) as dependent variable and trade patterns captured by dummy var-
iables. Standard errors clustered at the firm level: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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The addition of country fixed effects captures business
cycles that tend to be correlated across countries. Our
estimates of firm-level country-specific trade linkages
remain relatively unchanged with the addition of country
fixed effects, which is a contrast to the French evidence
where the addition of country fixed effects halves the
coefficient on exports and reduces the coefficient on
imports by three quarters. Differences in time periods
may be a partial explanation for the difference.18 The evi-
dence reported here provides further support for the con-
clusion in di Giovanni et al. (2018) that trade and
ownership linkages matter for the transmission of
shocks.
In Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 3 we include
interaction effects to capture matched trade with a
respective country. Point estimates for these interaction
effects are negative across all three specification, which
indicates that matching trade has a moderating effect on
the firm's exposure to foreign GDP shocks. Indeed, in
Column (5) we cannot reject that the total effect of mat-
ched trade with country n has zero effect on ρ(γft, γn,t),
for both net exporters and net importers.19 We also note
that, as in the French case, estimated effects are stronger
for import links than for export links. In Table 3 Col-
umns (2) and (3), the estimated effect of imports is signif-
icantly larger than exports at the 5 and 1% levels of
significance, respectively.20
These results are based on a dummy variable repre-
sentation of firm-level trade links across countries. This
binary measure of trade could lend too much weight to
firms that trade very little with a foreign country. We can
also take into account the intensity of the trade links,
which we turn to in Table 4.
We repeat the estimation of Equation (9), but this
time firm-level trade links are captured using a continu-
ous measure of trade intensity, that is, firm-level export
and import links are captured with SXf,n and SMf,n,
respectively. Both specifications, with share or binary
trade links, yield similar results: compare Columns (1),
(2) and (3) of Table 4 with the corresponding columns in
Table 3. Under Column (3), which includes firm and
country fixed effects, we report again that exporting and
importing are associated with a higher correlation with
the GDP, and that the magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance of the effects are stronger for imports than for
exports. In Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 4, we
include interaction effects for matched trade.
In Column (5), with firm fixed effects, the estimated
effects indicate that matching imports and exports from a
country reduces firm exposure to foreign GDP variation.
We cannot reject that the total effect of matching trade
with country n has zero effect on ρ(γft, γn,t), for both net
exporters and net importers.21 Natural hedging limits the
firm's exposure to foreign shocks. Our results suggest that
TABLE 4 Correlation with foreign GDP and firm level trade linkages (trade shares), Sweden 1997–2014
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exports 0.190*** 0.0144 0.0198* 0.242*** 0.0684*** 0.0609***
(0.0212) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0453) (0.0233) (0.0234)
Imports 0.315*** 0.0425*** 0.0430*** 0.320*** 0.0726*** 0.0627***
(0.0228) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0325) (0.0188) (0.0189)
Exports × net exp. −0.0652 −0.0695*** −0.0527**
(0.0475) (0.0259) (0.0260)
Imports × net imp. −0.0126 −0.0632** −0.0416
(0.0427) (0.0259) (0.0259)
Affiliate 0.00180 0.00659 0.00838** 0.00190 0.00682 0.00852**
(0.00536) (0.00420) (0.00421) (0.00536) (0.00421) (0.00421)
Constant 0.0705*** 0.0715*** 0.0882*** 0.0705*** 0.0715*** 0.0882***
(0.00138) (4.27e-05) (0.00115) (0.00138) (4.27e-05) (0.00115)
Observations 1,207,530 1,207,530 1,207,530 1,207,530 1,207,530 1,207,530
R-squared 0.000 0.452 0.453 0.000 0.452 0.453
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Note: This table reports the result of estimation Equation (9) with ρ(γft, γNt) as dependent variable and trade patterns captured by actual
values (in SEK) of (net) exports and (net) imports. Standard errors clustered at the firm level: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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the correlation between firm level profits and foreign
GDP is driven by firms that do not match trade with a
country. With country fixed effects the coefficients on the
interaction terms decrease somewhat and the coefficient
on interaction for net importers is no longer significant.
Being a foreign affiliate increases the firm's exposure to
foreign GDP shocks.
In sum, our results provide evidence that firm-level
trade increases the correlation between a firm's value
added growth and the GDP growth of the trading partner.
This corroborates the research of di Giovanni et al. (2018).
However, matching imports and exports from a country
at the firm level reduces the firm's exposure to foreign
shocks. The export and import effects cancel for firms
that both export to, and import from, a particular partner
country. The firm's exposure to foreign shocks is there-
fore a function of the net trade with a given country,
suggesting that natural hedging works from the perspec-
tive of the firm. Natural hedging may matter at the firm
level, but we can also determine if the firm-level effects
affect the aggregate correlations between the Swedish
economy and its trade partners, an issue that we turn to
in the next section.
4.2 | Aggregate implications
The country-level correlation between Swedish value
added growth and GDP growth in country n can be
expressed as a weighted average of firm-level correla-
tions, as described in Equation (8). We use the relation-
ship between firm-level and aggregate correlations to
examine three counterfactual settings. In the first coun-
terfactual, we sever firm-level trade and affiliate links
and ignore the effects of natural hedging. For the compu-
tation, we use the coefficients obtained from the estima-
tion of Equation (9) and reported in Column (6) of
Table 3. The predicted firm-level effect of severing all
international links is simply
Δρ̂f ,n = −β1EXf ,n−β3IMf ,n−β5AFFf ,n
We use Δρ̂f ,n , together with Equation (8), to compute
the aggregate effect of severing all international links.
Following the method of di Giovanni et al. (2018), we use
the average of ωf over the life of the firm in the sample.
Table 5 reports aggregate correlations with Sweden's
top 15 trading partners and the results of the
TABLE 5 Changes in aggregate correlations across Sweden's top 15 trade partners
Sever trade and affiliate
linkages: baseline
Sever trade and affiliate
linkages: no granularity
Sever trade and affiliate
linkages: natural hedge
Country
ρA ΔρA SE(ΔρA) ΔρA SE(ΔρA) ΔρA SE(ΔρA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Belgium 0.875 −0.087 0.013 −0.008 0.001 −0.071 0.011
China 0.128 −0.085 0.013 −0.010 0.001 −0.067 0.012
Germany 0.831 −0.122 0.017 −0.017 0.002 −0.098 0.019
Denmark 0.909 −0.118 0.017 −0.017 0.002 −0.096 0.015
Spain 0.681 −0.073 0.012 −0.006 0.001 −0.059 0.010
Finland 0.848 −0.114 0.016 −0.013 0.002 −0.091 0.016
France 0.872 −0.098 0.014 −0.010 0.001 −0.079 0.015
Great Britain 0.817 −0.114 0.016 −0.014 0.001 −0.093 0.015
Italy 0.905 −0.091 0.013 −0.010 0.001 −0.074 0.012
Japan 0.744 −0.074 0.011 −0.006 0.001 −0.057 0.012
Netherlands 0.795 −0.107 0.015 −0.013 0.001 −0.087 0.014
Norway 0.650 −0.154 0.023 −0.030 0.004 −0.121 0.022
Poland 0.470 −0.079 0.013 −0.007 0.001 −0.061 0.013
Russia 0.459 −0.060 0.010 −0.002 0.000 −0.047 0.009
USA 0.853 −0.144 0.020 −0.021 0.002 −0.115 0.020
Average 0.722 −0.101 −0.012 −0.081
Note: Column (1) of this table reports the correlation between the Swedish growth in value added and the respective partner country GDP
growth. The remaining columns present the estimated effect of various counterfactual experiments using the aggregation in Equation (8) on
the correlation (Columns 2, 4 and 6) as well as the respective standard errors of the estimated effects (Columns 3, 5 and 7). Counterfactual
exercises based on estimates reported in Column 6 of Table 3.
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counterfactual exercises. Column (1) reports the aggre-
gate correlation across trade partners. The country-level
correlations range from 0.13 for China to above 0.8 for
large countries like Germany and USA, and close coun-
tries like Denmark and Finland. Column (2) presents the
change in the aggregate correlation when international
linkages at the firm level are severed, which is the
weighted sum of Δρ̂f ,n across all firms in the sample.
Aggregate correlations are reduced by 0.10 on average.
This means that the average correlation between Swedish
value added growth and foreign GDP growth would fall
from 0.72 to 0.62 under this counterfactual. Column
(3) reports the standard error of the estimated reduction
in aggregate correlation, and all estimates are statistically
significant at the 1% level.
These counterfactual reductions in correlations are
similar to those reported for France in di Giovanni
et al. (2018), table 8), with an estimate of −0.098 for
France compared to −0.101 for Sweden. The level of
aggregate correlations between Sweden and its trade part-
ners is much higher at 0.722 compared to 0.291 for
France in the 1993–2007 period. A potential reason for
the difference that time period covered in the present
article includes the great recession when the business
cycle in many countries experienced a large simultaneous
fall and an, albeit less coordinated, coincident recovery.
We note that the average aggregate correlations for Swe-
den for the period 1997–2007 falls to approximately 0.5.
A second potential reason is that Sweden is a smaller and
more open economy than France, and as such Sweden's
economy can be expected to comove more with its trade
partners.
In the second counterfactual setting, we again sever
firm-level international links but weigh all firms equally
in the aggregation. To remove the effect of granularity
from the aggregation we compute Equation (8) and set
ωf = 1/k where k is the population of firms in the sample.
In Column (4), we report the predicted counterfactual
change in the correlation between Swedish value added
growth and foreign GDP growth. Without granularity,
the aggregate effect of severing firm-level international
links is small: on average the fall would be −0.012 and
average aggregate correlation would thus be reduced
from 0.722 to 0.710. Granularity plays a key role in gener-
ating aggregate effects from severing firm-level interna-
tional linkages [compare Column (2) and Column (4)].
With factual firm weights the effect of severing interna-
tional links is economically consequential at −0.083,
whereas it is economically inconsequential without gran-
ularity at −0.01.
Granularity plays an even greater role in Sweden than
in France: the French case reported in di Giovanni
et al. (2018), table 8) finds that the effect with actual
weights is four times as large as the effect without granu-
larity, whereas in the Swedish case the corresponding
number is eight times as large. This is in line with expec-
tations as Sweden is a smaller country with exports that
are more heavily dominated by relatively few large firms.
This reasoning can help clarify the reductions in correla-
tions across Sweden's trade partners. For instance, the
no-granularity counterfactual reduction in correlation
with equal weights is greatest for neighbouring Norway,
a market that is served also by many smaller Swedish
firms, and low for a hard to enter distant market like
Japan. Even though country-by-country estimates for the
no-granularity counterfactual are low, the estimated
effects are all statistically significant at the 1% level as
seen by the standard errors in Column (5).
With the third counterfactual, we ask if matched
trade at the firm level plays an important role in deter-
mining macro-level comovements. At the firm level, we
have established that natural hedging reduces the firm-
level correlation with a foreign market sufficiently to
make it statistically indistinguishable from zero, and we
have also established that firm-level international links
matter in aggregate. However, it is not clear if firm-level
matched trade has any impact on aggregate com-
ovements. We therefore repeat the first counterfactual
with factual firm weights, and estimate a Δρ̂matchedf ,n , which
includes the effects of matched trade, using the results
reported in Column (6) of Table 3:
Δρ̂matchedf ,n = −β1EXf ,n−β2EXf ,n ×match
EX
f ,n
−β3IMf ,n−β4IMf ,n ×match
IM
f ,n−β5AFFf ,n:
We aggregate these firm-level effects of severing inter-
national trade links using Equation (8) and find that
including matched trade effects has a consequential effect
on aggregate correlations. We report the results in Col-
umn (6) of Table 5. The average fall in correlation, when
we include natural hedging is −0.081, whereas the aver-
age fall in the benchmark specification is −0.101. Natural
hedging thus results in a limited, but still economically
significant, reduction in aggregate correlations.
To understand the foundation for a non-trivial, but
limited, effect of matched trade on aggregate correlations
we note that even though matched trade matters at the
firm-country level the summary statistics in Table 1 indi-
cate that overall the extent of matched trade is limited.
The index of natural hedging (GLINH) is on average 12.4
and 30.3 for the 50 largest firms. To put the latter in per-
spective note that these largest firms on average import
from around 10 markets and export to around 10 markets.
An average GLINH of 30 would then for instance be gen-
erated by a firm is a pure exporter in eight markets and a
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pure importer in eight markets with a 70% matched trade
for the remaining four markets (net exporter in two and
net importer in two). Such a pattern would be consistent
with a large effect of matched trade on covariances at the
firm level in those four markets but a limited effect of
matched trade on overall correlations.
5 | CONCLUSION
Understanding the extent and sources of international
business cycle comovement is a central issue for research
in international finance and of importance for guiding
policy on monetary unions and international policy coor-
dination. Theoretical developments and access to micro
data have spurred interest in the role of firm-level link-
ages in business cycle comovements.
We establish that firm-level exposure to foreign mar-
kets is a function of the firm's net trade with that market.
The evidence we report suggests that natural hedging
works. We document the extent of natural hedging at the
firm level and examine its effect on firm-level correla-
tions. Natural hedging is important at the firm level, and
also quantitatively important for macro-level business
cycle correlations across countries. Our results for Swe-
den are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the
pioneering work on French data, and we are thus among
the first to establish the robustness of these mechanisms
outside the French context. Sweden is a relatively small
country with a floating exchange rate and it will be inter-
esting to see in future work whether these results hold
also for other countries. With these findings, the article
makes a contribution to research at the intersection of
corporate finance and international finance.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST




1 Also note that the role of the nominal exchange rate in propagat-
ing shocks is of long-standing interest and the application of the
di Giovanni et al. (2018) methodology to a country with a floating
exchange rate against all its trading partners [Sweden rather than
France as in di Giovanni et al. (2018)] is therefore of interest
beyond replication.
2 There is remarkably little research on this form of natural hedg-
ing. One exception is the questionnaire evidence in Ito, Koibuchi,
Sato, and Shimizu (2016) who report that 40% of responding firms
use matching of currencies as a means of exchange rate risk
management.
3 Hoberg and Moon (2017) use textual analysis of U.S. annual
reports in connection with changes in the set of foreign currency
derivatives available to establish that the kind of natural hedging
that we are interested in indeed appears to affect trade patterns.
4 We examine natural hedging in terms of trade flows. There are
two other phenomena that are sometimes also referred to as natu-
ral hedging. One is that a firm may establish production capacity
in large foreign markets. This mechanism has been subject of
some research and on balance the results indicate that production
capacity abroad serves to limit exposure (Bartram, Brown, &
Minton, 2010; Hutson & Laing, 2014), even if some early studies
suggested limited or no effects (Allayannis, Ihrig, &
Weston, 2001). A second form of natural hedging is to denomi-
nate loans in the currency of important export markets, which is
a common practice among the firms surveyed in Graham and
Harvey (2001). One may of course wonder why firms would dis-
tort real operations in order to manage risk – why not let investors
rather than firms manage risk and why not use financial instru-
ments? On the first question, we note that a number of reasons
for risk management by firms have been put forward
(e.g., allowing stable investments in the face of credit constraints
as in Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993). On the second we note
that the evidence indeed indicates that use of financial derivatives
lowers risk but that substantial risk remains (Bartram, Brown, &
Conrad, 2011; Guay & Kothari, 2003) – which leaves open an
interest in the effectiveness of natural hedging.
5 In taking account of the development of (import) costs, we also
relate to work using more aggregate data but that attempts to con-
trol for input costs as in Duval, Li, Saraf, and Seneviratne (2016)
who use country-pair level data on value added in trade and find
a stronger correlation between this measure of trade and business
cycle correlation.
6 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this kind
of modelling framework.
7 See Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot (2017) for an analysis of interac-
tions between sourcing decisions and fixed costs across origins.
8 We are interested in the transmission of shocks through a firm's
linkages with foreign markets and will use constant weights as
part of our empirical strategy. Time varying weights risk con-
founding our measure of economic shocks.
9 Indeed, an important impetus to the interest in links between
trade and business cycle comovement was given by interest in
how a monetary union would affect risk and the case just dis-
cussed corresponds to a situation where the exchange rate plays a
key role in the transmission of international shocks (see
e.g., Artis & Ehrmann, 2006; Frankel & Rose, 1998; Friberg &
Vredin, 1997).
10 One caveat is that they also include a dummy for whether firm f
is a multinational that has an affiliate in country n, this variable
is not included in our data set.
11 We limit attention to firms that are active in at least 3 years and
drop firms in the healthcare and financial sectors.
12 These are, in order of importance: Germany, Norway, United
Kingdom, Denmark, USA, Netherlands, Finland, France, Bel-
gium, Italy, China, Russia, Poland, Spain and Japan. di Giovanni
et al. (2018) examine France's top nine trading partners and
Brazil.
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13 The Serrano database is available from the Stockholm School of
Economic's Swedish House of Finance Research Data Center.
14 HHI exports is calculated as the sum of squared export shares. A
firm that exports to two markets with respective shares of 0.85
and 0.15 would have an HHI of 0.75.
15 It should be acknowledged that there is some noise in this mea-
sure. As is typical, Swedish trade data are reported Free On
Board (FOB) for exports and Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) for
imports. We do not know the extent to which actual contracts
deviate from these conditions and instead specify for instance Ex
Works or Free Along Ship (see Ramberg, 2011 for a detailed
description of different contractual specifications of how trans-
port and insurance costs are handled). The noise so introduced
should be limited however; the evidence is patchy but detailed
studies indicate that the CIF-FOB margin is 3–5% for the US and
lower yet for European countries, see Miao and Fortanier (2017)
for a survey.
16 This is substantially higher than the corresponding correlation in
di Giovanni et al. (2018), we discuss the comparison in detail
when presenting the macro-level implications in Section 4.2.
17 They report 0.005 for exports and 0.013 for imports in the compa-
rable specification.
18 In particular one might ask if the years of the financial crisis,
2008–2009, are important for the different findings. Table 6
reports the same specifications as in Table 3 but excluding the
years of the financial crisis. As seen, the results are quite similar.
19 The estimated total effect of trade linkages for firms that match
trade is −0.001 with a p-value of .614 for net exporters, and .003
with a p-value of .088 for importers.
20 Under column (2) and (3), EXf,n < IMf,n is statistically significant
at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
21 The estimated total effect of trade linkages for firms that match
trade is −0.001 with a p-value of .924 for net exporters, and .009
with a p-value of .613 for importers.
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TABLE A1 Correlation with foreign GDP and firm level trade linkages (dummy variables), Sweden 1997–2014. Excluding years of the
financial crisis 2008 and 2009
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exporters 0.0235*** 0.00412* 0.00530** 0.0338*** 0.0112*** 0.00837***
(0.00314) (0.00222) (0.00235) (0.00414) (0.00284) (0.00286)
Importer 0.0404*** 0.00997*** 0.0123*** 0.0491*** 0.0148*** 0.0142***
(0.00291) (0.00194) (0.00200) (0.00346) (0.00228) (0.00232)
Exporter × net exp. −0.0190*** −0.0135*** −0.00598*
(0.00464) (0.00336) (0.00339)
Importer × net imp. −0.0211*** −0.0122*** −0.00475
(0.00446) (0.00321) (0.00320)
Affiliate −0.00583 0.00855 0.0116** −0.00524 0.00877* 0.0116**
(0.00569) (0.00520) (0.00520) (0.00569) (0.00521) (0.00521)
Constant 0.0543*** 0.0570*** 0.0825*** 0.0543*** 0.0571*** 0.0825***
(0.00131) (0.000145) (0.00137) (0.00131) (0.000145) (0.00137)
Observations 1,154,002 1,154,002 1,154,002 1,154,002 1,154,002 1,154,002
R-squared 0.000 0.327 0.330 0.000 0.327 0.330
Firm FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes
Note: This table reports the result of estimation Equation (9) with ρ(γft, γnt) as dependent variable and trade patterns captured by dummy var-
iables. Standard errors clustered at the firm level: *p < .10. **p < .05. **p < .01.
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